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Abstract
We study the query complexity of approximate notions of Nash
equilibrium in games with a large number of players n. Our main
result states that for n-player binary-action games and for constant
ε, the query complexity of an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is
exponential in n. One of the consequences of this result is an expo-
nential lower bound on the rate of convergence of adaptive dynamics
to approxiamte Nash equilibrium.
1 Introduction
The problem of computing Nash equilibrium is known to be hard (see [6]),
even for two-player games (see [4]). However, there are still many open
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questions regarding the complexity of an approximate Nash equilibrium. In
this paper we will focus on one of them. Given a normal form n-player
game with a constant number of actions m for each player, how hard is
it to compute an approximate Nash equilibrium? Note that in the above
problem the size of the input is exponential. A reasonable model to consider
in such a case is the query model. Instead of a huge input that contains the
whole game, we assume the existence of a black box. For every query of the
algorithm about payoffs in the game, the black box returns an answer. The
queries could be about either action profiles (see Section 3.1) or distributions
over action profiles (see Section 3.2). We measure the complexity of an
algorithm by the number of queries that it asks for the worst case input.
Before stating our main result on the query complexity of approximate
Nash equilibrium, we introduce the state of the art for the related question on
the query complexity of approximate correlated equilibrium. There exists a
randomized algorithm for computing an approximate correlated equilibrium
using only poly(n) payoff queries. Such a surprising1 result is achieved by
regret minimizing algorithms (for instance the regret matching algorithm; see
[17],[13],[15]). On the other hand, if we restrict the algorithm to be determin-
istic, then the computation of an approximate correlated equilibrium requires
exponential (in n) number of queries. This result is proved in a recent paper
by Hart and Nisan [17]. Obviously, this result induces an impossibility result
also for the computation of approximate Nash equilibrium. Namely, for de-
terministic algorithms the computation of an approximate Nash equilibrium
requires exponential (in n) number of payoff queries. But it leaves open the
1The result is surprising because after poly(n) queries the algorithm knows only a tiny
fraction of payoffs in the game (poly(n)mn ). Nevertheless, the algorithm knows (with high
probability) that a certain distribution forms an approximate correlated equilibrium.
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question on the query complexity of approximate Nash equilibrium for ran-
domized algorithms. This question was posed in [17] as an open problem.
In this paper we answer this question: the query complexity of an approxi-
mate Nash equilibrium is exponential, even for randomized algorithms (see
Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4).
We discuss two notions of additive approximation of equilibrium: approx-
imate Nash equilibrium and approximate well-supported Nash equilibrium
(see Section 2.2 for definition and a short discussion on these two notions).
Our main result (Theorem 2) states that even for a constant approximation
size, the query complexity of an approximate well supported Nash equilib-
rium in n-player binary-action games is 2Ω(n). The proof of the result is based
on a novel reduction from the problem of finding a fixed point of a function
to the problem of finding an approximate Nash equilibrium. The connection
between the hardness of computing Nash equilibria and the hardness of com-
puting fixed points was previously established (see [6] and [4]). However, the
established reductions fail to work for an approximate Nash equilibrium for
constant approximations. Beyond the simplicity of our reduction (see Section
4.1.1), to the best of my knowledge this is the first reduction that works for
an approximate notion of Nash equilibrium (the approximate well-supported
Nash equilibrium) with constant approximation.
The exponential lower bound on the query complexity of approximate
Nash equilibria has several applications and consequences.
1. For computational complexity, this result provides evidence that it
is very unlikely that there is a polynomial (in n) algorithm for computing
an approximate Nash equilibrium in n-player binary-action games. This is
because if such an algorithm exists, then it must depend on more complex
data of the game than just expected payoffs under distributions. Note that for
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the parallel question of computing an approximate or even an exact correlated
equilibrium, such an algorithm exists (see [20], and [24]).
2. The result provides insights into the rate of convergence of adaptive dy-
namics to an approximate Nash equilibrium (see Section 3.5). The question
of the convergence of adaptive dynamics to an exact Nash equilibrium (pure
or mixed) was studied by Hart and Mansour [12], where they provide expo-
nential lower bounds via communication complexity results. However, the
problem of convergence to an approximate Nash equilibrium remained open.
Our result yields an exponential lower bound on the rate of convergence of
adaptive dynamics to an approximate Nash equilibrium (see Corollary 2 and
Theorem 6) for a wide class of adaptive dynamics, which we call k-queries
dynamics (see Definition 1).
3. The third consequence follows from the proof of the main Theorem.
After reducing the problem of finding approximate well-supported Nash equi-
librium to the problem of finding approximate fixed point of a function, we
analyze the query complexity of finding approximate fixed point of a func-
tion for randomized algorithms. The complexity of computing approximate
fixed-point is of an independent interest and was previously studied in the
context of query complexity. Hirsch, Papadimitriou, and Vavasis [18] studied
it for deterministic algorithms, whereas we analyze it for randomized algo-
rithms. These more general settings allow us to answer an open question
that was posed in [18] twenty five years ago: what is the query complexity of
an approximate fixed point in the case where queries are distributions over
the domain (rather than just points in the domain). Theorem 5, answers this
question: even if the queries are distributions, an exp(n) number of queries
is needed to find an approximate fixed point.
In addition to the above mentioned literature, there are few other recent
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papers that study the query complexity of equilibria.
Fearnley, Gairing, Goldberg, and Savani [10] study the query complexity
of an approximate Nash equilibrium. In particular, they derive a lower bound
on the complexity of an approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player games.
In addition, they provide several classes of n-player games where a polynomial
number of queries is enough to find an approximate Nash equilibrium. The
negative result of this paper shows that unlike the above mentioned games,
in general games an exponential number of queries is needed.
Goldberg and Roth [11] study the query complexity of several notion
of approximate equilibria. In particular, they prove that for games with
succinct representation size p, the query complexity of approximate well-
supported Nash equilibrium is polynomial in n (number of players), m (num-
ber of actions for each player) and p (the representation size). This result
demonstrates that the exponential lower bound presented in the present pa-
per cannot hold for succinctly representable games. We point out that the
query algorithm of Goldberg and Roth [11] for computing an approximate
well-supported Nash equilibrium is not computationally efficient. Moreover,
in a recent paper, Rubinstain [26] proves that computing an approximate
well-supported Nash equilibrium is PPAD-hard for succinctly representable
games with n players and constant number of actions. His proof is based
on our novel reduction (Section 4.1.1) from the fixed point problem to the
approximate Nash equilibrium problem, which holds for constant ε. In an
even more recent paper, Rubinstain [27] proves that this PPAD-hardness re-
sult actually holds for a very simple class of succinctly representable games:
graphical polimatrix games.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 The query model
In the query model every problem Π is specified by possible inputs, desired
outputs, and queries. The queries are specified by the type of questions that
can be asked, and by the answers that are provided. A query algorithm, which
in this paper will be called simply algorithm, is a procedure that asks queries
in an adaptive manner and essentially for every input generates an output.
Note that we put no computational constraints on the way the algorithm
generates the next query or the output, given the previous answers.
For randomized algorithms, we allow errors in the output. Namely, we
require that for all inputs the answer will be correct only with probability
p < 1.
Given an input, the number of queries of a randomized algorithm is a ran-
dom variable. There are two reasonable definitions for the query complexity
of a probabilistic algorithm. One definition is via expectation, namely, the ex-
pected number of queries for outputting the correct answer with probability
p, which is denoted by QCE,p(Π). Another definition restricts the number of
queries to be at most T , and we ask what is the minimal number T such that
there exists an algorithm that outputs the correct answer with probability
p. We denote this number of queries by QCp(Π). There is a close relation
between these two definitions. One such relation is given in the following
remark.
Remark 1. Note that QCp(Π) ≤ 2QCE,2p(Π), because for an algorithm with
expected query complexity q that outputs the correct answer with probability
2p, we can stop the algorithm after 2q steps. Then, by Markov inequality,
the output will be correct with probability of at least 1
2
(2p).
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The results in the present paper are lower bounds. We will formulate the
results using QCp. By the above remark we can easily translate all these
lower bounds on QCp into lower bounds on QCE,2p.
2.2 Normal form games
We consider normal form n-player games where every player has m actions,
and the payoffs are in [0, 1]. We use the standard notations. The set of
players is [n]. The set of actions of player i is Ai. The set of action profiles
is A = ×iAi. The payoff function of player i is ui : A → [0, 1]. The set
of mixed strategies of player i is denoted by ∆(Ai). For a mixed strategy
xi ∈ ∆(Ai) we denote by supp(xi) ⊂ Ai the set of strategies that are played
with positive probability. The set of distributions over action profiles is
denoted by ∆(A). The payoff function ui can be multilinearly extended into
ui : ∆(A)→ [0, 1]. The payoffs profile is denoted by u = (ui)ni=1, and we will
identify the game with u.
Given a profile of mixed actions x = (xi)
n
i=1 where xi ∈ ∆(Ai), we denote
by bri(x) = maxai∈Aiui(ai, x−i) the best-reply value of player i, i.e., the
maximal payoff that player i can get against opponents’ strategy x−i.
There are two different notions for an additive approximation for Nash
equilibrium.
The first one, an ε-Nash equilibrium (ε-NE for short), requires that every
player receives a payoff of at least bri(x) − ε, i.e., ui(x) ≥ bri(x) − ε for
every player i. Namely, the mixed strategy of a player leads to a high enough
payoff.
The second one, which is not less intuitive, is an ε-well-supported Nash
equilibrium (ε-WSNE for short) which requires that every player assign pos-
itive probability only to actions which lead to a payoff of at least bri(x)− ε,
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i.e., if ai ∈ supp(xi) then ui(ai, x−i) ≥ bri(x)− ε. Namely, each action that a
player plays, leads to a high enough payoff.
Note that every ε-WSNE is an ε-NE, but not vice versa. Nevertheless,
we can construct an approximate WSNE from an approximate NE by relax-
ing the approximation from ε to Θ(
√
εn). Such a construction appears in
Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou [6], Lemma 4.28, and a variation
of this construction appears in the proof of Theorem 4 in the Appendix A.
Our main focus in this paper will be on approximate well supported Nash
equilibria. But it will induce results also about approximate Nash equilibria
(see Theorem 4).
3 The Results
3.1 The main results
Consider the problem of an approximate well-supported Nash equilibrium.
WSN(n,m, ε):
INPUT- n-player game u where every player hasm actions and the payoffs
are in [0, 1].
OUTPUT- An ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium.
QUERIES- Each query is a pure action profiles a and the answer is the
payoffs profile u(a).
We show in Theorem 2 that even for the case of m = 2 and constant
ε the problem WSN requires 2Ω(n) queries. Before that, we introduce in
Theorem 1 slightly weaker result: for constant m and constant ε the problem
WSN requires 2Ω(n) queries. The reasons for including the weaker result
are the following two. First, the proof of the stronger result (for the case of
m = 2) is based on the proof of the weaker result (for the case of constant
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m) which is cleaner and simpler for understanding. Second, the lower bound
for the case of constant m is 2n/6 (if we ignore polynomial factors) whereas
the lower bound for the case of m = 2 is 2n/22170. Namely, the lower bound
for the case of constant m is significantly better (although both of them are
exponential).
3.1.1 Constant number of actions for each player
Theorem 1. Fix m = 3609 and ε = 1
2
10−7. For every probabilistic algorithm
that uses 16·2n/6/n4 pure-action queries to compute an ε-well-supported Nash
equilibrium in n-player games with m actions for all players, there exists a
game where it returns a correct answer with probability of at most 3 · 2−n/6.
I.e.,
QCp(WSN(n,m, ε)) ≥ 162
n
6
n4
= 2Ω(n)
for p = 3 · 2−n/6.
This theorem is in contrast to the correlated equilibrium case, where the
regret-minimizing algorithms (see, e.g., [23] and [13]) require only a polyno-
mial number of queries to find an approximate correlated equilibrium.
The complete proof of Theorem 1 appears in Section 4. We present here
a brief outline of the proof.
Outline of the proof of Theorem 1. The proof is done in three steps.
In the first step (Section 4.1.1), we reduce the problem of finding approx-
imated WSNE in a 2n-player game to the problem of finding an approximate
fixed point of a Lipschitz continuous n-dimensional mapping. For every func-
tion f we define a game u = u(f) (see equations (1) and (2)), such that every
approximate WSNE of u(f) corresponds to an approximate fixed point of f .
This reduction is based on a proof of Brower’s fixed-point theorem using
Nash’s theorem. The proof appears in a blog by Eran Shmaya [29].
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In the second step (Section 4.2), we introduce the reduction of Hirsch,
Papadimitriou, and Vavasis [18] from the problem of finding an approximate
fixed point of an n-dimensional mapping to the problem of finding the end
of a simple path (path with no cycles) on the n-dimensional hypercube. For
every simple path α, they construct in a mapping f = f(α) such that every
fixed point of f corresponds to the end of the path α (see properties (P1)–
(P3) in Remark 4).
Finally, in the third step (Section 4.3), we prove that the end of a simple
path is a hard problem, even in probabilistic settings. Hart and Nisan [17]
show that the end of a path (not necessarily a simple one) is a hard problem.
Using similar arguments to those in [17], we strengthen this hardness result:
it is hard to find the end of a path, even if it is known that the path is simple.
3.1.2 Binary-action games
Theorem 1 proves an exponential lower bound on the number of queries
that are required for finding an approximate WSNE for games with constant
(m = 3609), but huge, number of actions for each player. Our second main
theorem states that an exponential lower bound holds even for the case where
each player has only two actions (m = 2).
Theorem 2. There exist constants2 c1, c2, ε > 0 such that for p = 2
−c1n =
2−Ω(n) holds
QCp(WSN(n, 2, ε)) ≥ 2c2n = 2Ω(n).
The proof is relegated to Section 4. The idea is to modify the reduction
from the approximate fixed point problem to approximate WSNE that ap-
pears in the proof of Theorem 1. We introduce a version of this reduction
2We prove the result for the constants c1 = c2 =
1
22170 and ε =
1
14·106 .
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that holds for binary-action games. Roughly speaking, the idea is to replace
a player with m actions by m different agents where each agent has only two
actions. The specific structure of the payoffs in the reduction of Theorem 1
allows us to do so, without changing the property that every approximate
WSNE of the constructed game corresponds to an approximate fixed point
of the function.
Remark 2. In the remainder of the paper, we will state all the conse-
quences from the main theorems for binary action games rather than for
games with constant number of actions, simply because this result is theo-
retically stronger.
All the consequences can be stated also for the case of constant number
of actions (more precisely, for games with 3609 actions for each player), and
then the constant at the exponent of the lower bound is significantly better
(1
6
instead of 1
22170
).
Remark 3. For ease of presentation, in the remainder of the paper, we will
not explicitly mention the exact constants in the theorem statements. Our
results are essentially asymptotic in nature. The exact constants that follow
from our proofs are poor (for example, we prove a lower bound of 2cn for a
very small value of c). Improving the underlying constants remains an open
question.
3.2 Distribution queries
In Theorem 2 we considered the model where each query is a pure action
profile a ∈ A in the game. We would like to generalize the exponential lower
bound of Theorem 2 to the case where each query can be a distribution over
action profiles x ∈ ∆(A).
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The most natural model that comes to mind is the one where the answer
to the query x is the exact value u(x). This model is not so interesting. In
this model one query is enough to receive the complete information about
all the payoffs in the game. We illustrate this fact by an example.
Example 1. Assume that all payoffs are 0 or 1. We numerate all the action
profiles in the game by A = {a(0), a(1), ..., a(N − 1)} where N = mn, and
we query the distribution x with
x(a(j)) =
2j
2N − 1 .
From the answer
u(x) =
1
2N − 1
N−1∑
j=0
u(a(j))2j
the algorithm can derive all the values u(a(j)).
This example can be easily generalized from the 0, 1-payoffs case to the
case where all payoffs are from the set {k/M : 0 ≤ k ≤ M,k ∈ N} for every
M .
The exact-answer model mentioned above is not so interesting because
the answer u(x) may contain a huge amount of information, as illustrated in
Example 1.
A reasonable way to overcome this issue is to assume that the answers
are given with precision δ. Namely, for every query x ∈ ∆(A) the answer is
some vector w ∈ Rn where ||w− u(x)||∞ < δ. In this model we consider the
problem of approximate WSNE.
WSN dist(n,m, ε, δ):
INPUT- n-player game u where every player hasm actions and the payoffs
are in [0, 1].
OUTPUT- An ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium.
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QUERIES- Each query is a distribution over actions x ∈ ∆(A) and the
answer is some payoff vector w where ||w − u(x)||∞ ≤ δ.
We will say that an algorithm solves the problem WSN dist in T queries
(xt)
T
t=1 if it outputs the correct answer for every sequence of answers (wt)
T
t=1
where ||wt − u(xt)||∞ < δ for all t ∈ [T ].
For every distribution query x, the answer u(x) can be well approximated
by a long enough sequence of pure action queries, simply by sampling from
the distribution x in an i.i.d. manner (see [22]). Hence the impossibility result
of theorems 1 and 2 yields an impossibility result also for the distribution
model.
Theorem 3. QCp(WSN dist(n, 2, ε, δ)) = δ
22Ω(n) for constant ε and for
p = 2−Ω(n).
Theorem 3 yields that even for answers that are given with exponentially
small precision (i.e., δ = 2−Ω(n)), the exponential lower bound still holds.
Theorem 3 emphasizes even more the difference from the correlated equi-
librium case. Following Jiang and Layton-Brown [20], an exact correlated
equilibrium can be computed using a polynomial number of distribution
queries (see also [1]). By Theorem 3, then, not only an exact Nash equi-
librium, but even an approximate Nash equilibrium cannot be computed.
Proof of Theorem 3. Every WSN dist algorithm that uses δ
22cn/n distribu-
tion queries with success probability p+δ22(c−2)n induces aWSN algorithm
with 2cn queries with success probability p. We replace every distribution
query x by n/δ2 pure action queries that are sampled i.i.d. from x. By Ho-
effding’s inequality (see [19]), the probability that the sample approximates
ui(x) with a precision of δ is at least 1−2e−2n > 1−2−2n. Therefore the prob-
ability that all the δ22cn/n queries will be well approximated for all players
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is at least 1− δ22cn2−2n = 1− δ22(c−2)n.
By Theorem 2 for constant c < 2 and p = 2−Ω(n) there is no WSN algo-
rithm with 2cn queries with success probability p. This implies that for every
algorithm that uses δ22cn/n = δ22Ω(n) distribution queries the probability of
success is at most p+ δ22(c−2)n = 2−Ω(n).
3.3 Approximate Nash equilibrium
The approximate (not necessarily well-supported) Nash equilibrium problem
is denoted by ANE. ANE has the same input and the same queries as
the WSN problem. The desired output is an ε-Nash equilibrium. For the
approximate Nash equilibrium case, Theorem 1 induces the following result.
Theorem 4. QCp(ANE(n, 2,
1
n
)) ≥ 2Ω(n) for p = 2−Ω(n).
This theorem excludes the possibility of a sub-exponential full approxi-
mation scheme for the Nash equilibrium in the query model.
The idea of the proof of Theorem 4 is simple, and is presented below.
The formal proof is slightly technical and it is relegated to the Appendix.
Outline of the proof of Theorem 4. The idea is that we can construct
O(ε)-WSNE (yi)
n
i=1 from an (ε
2/n)-Nash equilibrium (xi)
n
i=1. Once we prove
this, the lower bound QCp(ANE(n, 2,
ε2
n
)) ≥ 2Ω(n) follows immediately from
Theorem 2.
Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou [6], Lemma 4.28, present such
a construction. For every player i let a∗i be one of the best replies to x−i, and
let bri = ui(a
∗
i , x−i) be the best-reply value. Fix the threshold ti = bri − ε.
In the mixed strategy yi, every probability mass on an action ai such that
ui(ai, x−i) < ti is replaced by a probability mass on the action a∗i .
We cannot use this construction directly, because in the pure-action
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queries model the values ui(ai, x−i) are not known to the algorithm. Never-
theless, we can use approximations to those values through sampling (similar
to Theorem 3). In the proof of the theorem we show that the above con-
struction can be done even if we use approximate values for ui(ai, x−i) rather
than exact ones.
3.4 The approximate fixed-point problem
We will consider the || · ||∞ norm on Rn. Thus, a function f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n
is λ-Lipschitz if ||f(x) − f(y)||∞ ≤ λ||x − y||∞. A point x ∈ [0, 1]n is an
ε-fixed point of f if ||f(x)− x||∞ ≤ ε. The approximate fixed-point problem
is defined as follows.
AFP (n, λ, ε):
INPUT- λ-Lipschitz function f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n.
OUTPUT- ε-fixed point of f .
QUERIES- Each query is a point x ∈ [0, 1]n and the answer is f(x).
The query complexity of the approximate fixed-point problem was stud-
ied by Hirsch, Papdimitriou, and Vavasis [18] in deterministic settings. As
was mentioned above, in the proof of Theorem 1 we reduce the problem
of an approximate WSNE to the problem of an approximate fixed point.
Then we prove that the approximate fixed-point problem requires an expo-
nential number of queries, even if we allow probabilistic algorithms. This
result generalizes the result in [18] to probabilistic algorithms, and may be
of independent interest.
Corollary 1. Fix λ = 79 and ε = 1/88, then for p = 2−Ω(n) holds
QCp(AFP (n, λ, ε)) = 2
Ω(n).
Moreover, in probabilistic settings (unlike deterministic settings) we can
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use the sampling method to derive lower bounds for the case where the
queries are distributions. This observation answers the open question that
was presented in [18]: what is the query complexity of finding an approximate
fixed point of a function f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n when every query is a distribution
over [0, 1]n?
Note that exactly as in the Nash equilibrium case (see the beginning of
Section 3.2), the case where the answer to a distribution µ is the exact value
Ex∼µf(x) is not interesting. By similar arguments to those that appear in
Example 1, we can use only one query to get the values of f on an arbitrary
small grid, if we know that the values of the function on this grid are rational
numbers with a denominator at most M . This is indeed the case, for instance,
if the function is rational (a quotient of two polynomials). Therefore, as
in Section 3.2, we analyze the problem when the answers are given with a
precision δ.
AFP dist(n, λ, ε, δ):
INPUT- λ-Lipschitz function f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n.
OUTPUT- An ε-fixed point of f .
QUERIES- Each query is a distribution µ over [0, 1]n and the answer is
some vector w where ||w − Ex∼µf(x)||∞ < δ.
Theorem 5. Fix λ = 79 and ε = 1/88, then for p = 2−Ω(n) holds
QCp(AFP dist(n, λ, ε, δ)) ≥ δ22Ω(n).
Note that even if the answers are given with an exponentially small pre-
cision (δ = 2−Ω(n)), the exponential lower bound still holds.
The proof is exactly the same as the proof of Theorem 3: we can imple-
ment every AFP dist algorithm by an AFP algorithm using the sampling
method.
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3.5 Adaptive dynamics
One of the central tools to derive lower bounds on the rate of convergence of
adaptive dynamics is the communication complexity tool (see [21]). Conitser
and Sandholm [5] first introduced this idea in their study of two-player games.
Later, Hart and Mansour [12] studied the communication complexity of Nash
equilibria in n-player games. Hart and Mansour [12] showed that the commu-
nication complexity of exact pure and mixed Nash equilibria is exponential
in n. As a consequence, they derived that there exists no uncoupled dynamic
(see [14] and [16] for definition and discussion on uncoupled dynamics) that
converges to a pure or an exact mixed Nash equilibrium faster than exp(cn)
steps (for constant c). The question regarding the communication complexity
of and the rate of convergence to an approximate Nash equilibrium, however,
remained an open question.
Here we will not address the question of the communication complexity
of an approximate Nash equilibrium. The query complexity model is weaker
than the communication complexity model. Nevertheless, our result on the
query complexity does induce interesting insights into the rate of convergence
to an approximate Nash equilibrium of adaptive dynamics.
The communication complexity model induces results on the important
class of uncoupled dynamics. The query complexity model induces results
on a different class of dynamics, which we will call k-queries dynamics. As
we will see, this class of dynamics contains most of the known adaptive
dynamics.
3.5.1 Dynamics model and k-queries dynamics
We introduce very brief description of the dynamic model.
In the dynamic settings we assume that the same one shot game u is
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played repeatedly over time t = 1, 2, .... A history of play at time t is the
sequence h(t) = (a(1), a(2), ..., a(t − 1)) of past realized action profiles. For
general dynamic, the mixed action of every player i at time t depends on
the game u and on the history of play at time t, and will be denoted by
xi(t) = si(u, h(t)). The realized pure action profile a(t) is drawn according to
the mixed action profile (xi(t))i∈[n]. The dynamic is specified by the mappings
(si)i∈[n], where si maps every payoff function and history of play to player’s
i next mixed action.
The idea in the definition of k-queries dynamics is to ask: How many
additional payoff queries are needed to calculate the mixed strategies xi(t) =
si(u, ht) of all player i at time t? Where by “additional” we mean “additional
to the queries that was already asked until time t− 1”.
Let as illustrate this idea by an example.
Example 2. Consider the class of regret based dynamic, i.e., dynamics where
at each time t, the mixed action of every player i is a function of the regrets
{Riai→a′i : ai, a
′
i ∈ Ai} , where the regrets are calculated according to the
aggregate joint action of the opponents until time t. See [15] for the definition
of regrets and a discussion on regret-based dynamics. Note that all the regrets
of player i at time t depend only on the payoffs {ui(ai, a(t′)−i) : ai ∈ Ai, t′ <
t}. Therefore, in order to calculate the regrets of player i it is sufficient
at each time t to query the m actions {(ai, a(t − 1)−i) : ai ∈ Ai} (note
that the actions {(ai, a(t′)−i) : ai ∈ Ai, t′ < t − 1} was already queried
in the previous steps). Hence, we will say that regret based dynamics are
nm-queries dynamics, because nm additional payoff queries at each step are
sufficient to calculate the mixed strategy of all players.
The formal definition is as follows:
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Definition 1. A dynamic will be called k-queries dynamic, if there exists
a mapping that assigns to each history of play a set of k (additional) pure
actions payoff queries, such that the mixed strategy of all players at time t
can be calculated using the tk queries until time t.
3.5.2 The generality of k-queries dynamics
We argue that most studied adaptive dynamics are mn-queries dynamics.
Example 2 illustrates the fact that regret based dynamics are mn-queries
dynamics. The arguments in the example can be applied not only to the
regret matching dynamic, but also to many the other studied regret mini-
mizing dynamics as eigenvector dynamics, smooth fictitious play, and joint
strategy fictitious-play (an overview of regret minimizing dynamics appears
in [15]).
Better reply dynamics are also mn-queries dynamics, because the mixed
action of every player i at time t depends on the set of payoffs {ui(ai, a(t−1)) :
ai ∈ Ai}, which again requires mn queries. The class of better reply dynamics
includes important dynamics as best-reply dynamic and logit dynamic (see
[3]).
Another class of dynamics that was studied in the literature is evolution-
ary dynamics, as for example replicator dynamics, and smith dynamic (an
overview of regret minimizing dynamics appears in [29]). Evolutionary dy-
namics in population games are a specific case of better-reply dynamics, and
therefore they are also mn-queries dynamics.
3.5.3 Lower bound on the rate of convergence
Clearly every k-queries dynamic that converges to an approximate equilib-
rium (or any other solution concept of the game) in T steps with probability p
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induces a query algorithm in the pure-query model that finds an approximate
equilibrium in at most kT queries with probability p.
Therefore, from Theorem 2 we get the following corollary regarding the
rate of convergence of k-queries dynamics:
Corollary 2. There is no k-queries dynamic that converges to an ε-well-
supported Nash equilibrium in 2Ω(n)/k steps with probability of at least 2−Ω(n)
in all n-player binary action games.
By the Minmax Theorem (which is also called in this context Yaho’s min-
max Theorem) the impossibility result can also be extended to the Bayesian
settings, where the game is drawn according to a probability distribution.
Corollary 3. There exists a distribution over n-players binary-actions games,
such that for every k-queries dynamic the expected3 number of steps until
the dynamic converges to a ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is at least
2Ω(n)/k.
Corollary 3 states that there exists a distribution over games which is
universally bed instances for all dynamics, whereas Corollary 2 states that
for every dynamic there exists some bad instances.
There are important dynamics, as for example the fictitious-play dynamic
(see [25]), where in order to calculate the mixed action of the player using
small number of queries we must use mixed action queries, rather than pure.
In fictitious-play for example the strategy of every player i at time t is de-
termined by the payoffs {ui(ai, (gj)j 6=i) : ai ∈ Ai}, where gj is the aggregate
behavior of player j up to time t. For those dynamics we can similarly define
3The expectation of the number of steps is taken over the game and the probabilistic
process induced by the dynamic (in case the dynamic is not deterministic).
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k-mixed-queries dynamics, or more general class of k-distribution-queries dy-
namics. In order to derive a lower bound on the rate of convergence of those
dynamics we should rely on the impossibility result of Theorem 3, which
corresponds to the case where the queries could be mixed actions, or more
general– distributions over action profiles. A difficulty arises when we try to
do so. The query model in Theorem 3 assumes that the answers are given
with a precision δ, whereas in the dynamics model the answers are precise.
An additional assumption of continuity of the dynamic (see Definition 3),
makes it possible to derive a query algorithm with approximate answers us-
ing a dynamic that depends on the exact answers. The formal discussion
on distribution-queries dynamics, and the lower bound on the rate of con-
vergence of continuous k-distribution-queries dynamics (see Theorem 6) are
relegated to Appendix B.
4 Proof of Theorem 1
4.1 From Approximate Nash Equilibrium to Approxi-
mate Fixed Point
4.1.1 Games with constant number of actions
We show a reduction from the AFP (n, λ, ε) problem to the WSN(2n, k +
1, 3
4k2
) problem, where k = dλ+3
2ε
e (see Sections 3.1 and 3.3 for the definitions
of the problems). The reduction is based on a construction that proves
Brower’s fixed-point theorem using Nash’s theorem, and appears in a blog of
Eran Shmaya [29].
Given a λ-Lipschitz function f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n, we construct a game
with two groups of n players. The action set of all players is {0, 1
k
, 2
k
, ..., 1}
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for k = dλ+3
2ε
e. We denote by a = (ai)ni=1/b = (bi)ni=1 the vector that is played
by the first/second group of players. The payoff function of player i in the
first group is defined by
ui(a, b) = −|ai − bi|2. (1)
The payoff function of player i in the second group is defined by
vi(a, b) = −|bi − fi(a)|2, (2)
where fi denotes the ith coordinate of the function f .
Simply speaking, the first group is trying to match the vector of the
second group, whereas the second group is trying to match the f operation
on the vector of the first group.
Let (x, y) be a 3
4k2
-WSNE of the game, where x = (xi)
n
i=1/y = (yi)
n
i=1 is
the mixed-actions profile of the players in the first/second group.
The payoff of player i in the first group that faces the mixed strategy y
of the second group can be written as
ui(ai, y) = −(ai − E(yi))2 − V ar(yi). (3)
Let αi ∈ N be such that αik ≤ E(yi) ≤ αi+1k . W.l.o.g. we assume that
E(yi) ≤ αi+0.5k ; i.e., E(yi) is closer to αik than to αi+1k . By equality (3) it is
clear that αi
k
is a best reply of player i and his payoff at a best reply is at
least
ui(
αi
k
, y) ≥ − 1
4k2
− V ar(yi). (4)
For every action γ
k
where γ 6= αi, αi + 1, player i’s payoff is at most
ui(
γ
k
, y) ≤ − 1
k2
− V ar(yi). (5)
Therefore in a 3
4k2
-WSNE player i assigns positive probability only to the
strategies αi
k
and αi+1
k
.
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Following similar arguments for the second group of players we write
player’s i payoff as
vi(x, bi) = −(bi − E(fi(x)))2 − V ar(fi(x)),
and we derive that player i assigns positive probability only to the strategies
βi
k
and βi+1
k
where βi
k
≤ E(fi(x)) ≤ βi+1k .
For every approximate WSNE we set ci =
αi+0.5
k
, and di =
βi+0.5
k
. We
claim that the point c = (ci)i∈[n] is an approximate fixed point of f .
For every i we have
|ci − di| ≤ |c− E(yi)|+ |E(yi)− di| ≤ 0.5
k
+
0.5
k
and
|di − fi(c)| ≤ |di − E(fi(x))|+ |E(fi(x))− fi(c)| ≤ 0.5
k
+ λ
0.5
k
.
Therefore |ci − fi(c)| ≤ λ+32k ≤ ε, which implies that ||c− f(c)||∞ ≤ ε.
This construction yields the following result.
Proposition 1. For every p > 0, n ≥ 1, λ ≥ 0, and ε ≥ 0, set k = dλ+3
2ε
e.
Then we have
QCp(WSN(2n, k + 1,
3
4k2
)) ≥ QCp(AFP (n, λ, ε)).
Proof. Let F be the set of all λ-Lipschitz functions f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n.
Let U be the set of games that correspond to F by the above-presented
construction.
Every WSN algorithm with success probability p on the set of games U
induces an AFP algorithm with success probability p. The induced AFP
algorithm will follow theWSN algorithm. Each query (a, b) will be mapped
to the query f(a). Note that by equations (1) and (2), f(a) is sufficient to
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get the answer for the payoff profile (ui, vi). Therefore the AFP algorithm
can indeed follow the WSN algorithm. Finally, given a 3
4k2
-WSNE the
algorithm can compute the values (αi)i∈[n] and to find the approximate fixed
point c = (ci) of f .
4.1.2 Binary-action games
The idea is to use similar idea to those presented above (Section 4.1.1). Here,
instead of 2n players with k+ 1 actions for each player, we construct a game
with 2n(k−1) players with two actions for each player. In the above reduction
the action set of each player i is {0, 1
k
, 2
k
, ..., 1}. We replace every player i
(in each one of the two groups) by k − 1 agents (i, 1
k
), (i, 2
k
), ..., (i, k−1
k
). The
action set of agent (i, j
k
) is Ai,j := { j−1k , j+1k }. For simplicity of notations,
it will be convenient to have two additional agents: agent (i, 0
k
) with single
action Ai,0 = { 1k}, and agent (i, kk ) with single action4 Ai,k = {k−1k }. When
agent (i, j
k
) plays the action (i, j±1
k
) we will say that agent (i, j
k
) is pointing
on player (i, j±1
k
).
For every i, given an action profile of the agents (i, j
k
)kj=0, the realized
value of the ith agents is defined to be ri :=
c+0.5
k
where (c, c + 1) is the
minimal pair of agents that pointing on each other. In other words, the
minimal c such that (i, c+1
k
) plays c
k
). Note that the realized value is well
defined because the last agent k
k
always play k−1
k
.
The payoff functions of the agents are defined similar to the previous
reduction (Section 4.1.1), but with respect to the realized values.
The payoff of agent (i, j
k
) for a player i in the first group is defined by
ui, j
k
= −|ai, j
k
−ri|2, where ri is the realized value of the i-agents in the second
group. Similarly, the payoff of agent (i, j
k
) for a player i in the second group
4Since these two additional agents have a single action they are not counted as players.
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is defined by vi, j
k
= −|ai, j
k
−f(r)|2, where r is the profile of the realized value
of all agents in the first group.
Every mixed action profile of the agents in the second group y induces
a distribution ρ on the realized values of the second group. The payoffs of
agent (i, j
k
) that facing a mixed action profile can be written as
ui, j
k
(a, y) = −(ai, j
k
− E(ρi))2 − V ar(ρi).
Therefore, the difference in payoffs for the two possible actions of agent (i, j
k
)
is given by
di,j = ui, j
k
(
j − 1
k
, y
)
− ui, j
k
(
j + 1
k
, y
)
= −
(
j − 1
k
− E(ρi)
)2
+
(
j + 1
k
− E(ρi)
)2
=
(
j + 1
k
− j − 1
k
)(
j + 1
k
+
j − 1
k
− 2E(ρi)
)
=
4
k
(
j
k
− E(ρi)
) (6)
In every 1
k2
-WSNE the mixed actions of the ith agents satisfy:
(1) Every agent (i, j
k
) such that j
k
< E(ρi)− 14k plays the action j+1k with
probability 1. This follows from equation (6), because in such a case we have
di,j < − 1k2 , which implies that the action j+1k is better than the action j+1k
by at least 1
k2
.
(2) Similarly, every agent (i, j
k
) such that j
k
> E(ρi) + 14k plays the action
j+1
k
with probability 1.
Let ci be the closest integer multiple of
1
k
to E(ρi) (formally, ci = [kE(ρi)]k ,
where [x] is the closest integer to x). By observations (1) we obtain that
every agent (i, j
k
) for j
k
< ci plays
j+1
k
. By observations (2) we obtain that
every agent (i, j
k
) for j
k
> ci plays
j−1
k
. Therefore the realized value of the ith
agents is either ri = ci− 0.5 or ri = ci + 0.5, and in any case |ri−E(ρi)| ≤ 1k .
By repeating the same arguments for the second group of players we
obtain that in every 1
k2
-WSNE the realized value si of the ith agents satisfies
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|si−Er∼ω(fi(r))| ≤ 1k where ω is the distribution of the realized value profiles
for the first group.
Let (ρ, ω) be the distributions over the realized values profiles of both
groups in an 1
k2
-WSNE. Let (r, s) be a profile of realized values in the support
of (ρ, ω). We claim that r is an approximate approximate fixed point of f .
|ri − si| ≤ |ri − E(ρi)|+ |E(ρi)− si| ≤ 1
k
+
0.5
k
and
|si − fi(r)| ≤ |si − Er∼ω(fi(r))|+ |Er∼ω(fi(r))− si| ≤ 1
k
+ λ
0.5
k
Therefore, |ri − fi(r)| ≤ 5+λ2k .
If we set k = d5+λ
2ε
e we have that |ri − fi(r)| ≤ ε.
This construction yields the following result.
Proposition 2. For every p > 0, n ≥ 1, λ ≥ 0, and ε ≥ 0, set k = d5+λ
2ε
e.
Then we have
QCp(WSN(2n(k − 1), 2, 1
k2
)) ≥ QCp(AFP (n, λ, ε)).
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.
4.2 From Approximate Fixed Point to End of Path
We denote by G(n, k) the graph of the n-dimensional grid of size k. The
set of vertices of G(n, k) is (ci)
n
i=1, where ci ∈ [k]. There is an edge between
(ci)
n
i=1 and (c
′
i)
n
i=1 iff ci = c
′
i for all indexes i except for one index j for which
|cj − c′j| = 1. Note that G(n, 2) is the hypercube. A path on a graph will be
called simple if it contains no cycles.
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In this section we prove a reduction from the approximate fixed point
problem AFP (n, 79, 1/88) to the end-of-a-simple-path problem:
ESP (n):
INPUT- Simple path on the n-dimensional hypercube (G(n, 2)) that starts
at (1, 1, ..., 1).
OUTPUT- The end-of-path vertex.
QUERIES- Each query is a vertex v of the hypercube. The answer is
whether the path visits this vertex. If it does, then, in addition, the black
box reports the path’s previous and next visits.
The query complexity of an approximate fixed point has been studied by
Hirsch, Papadimitriou and Vavasis [18], where they show an exponential (in
the dimension) lower bound. We cannot use the result of [18] straightfor-
wardly, because they consider deterministic settings, whereas we are inter-
ested in probabilistic settings. Nevertheless, we will rely on one part of their
proof. Namely, we will use their reduction from the approximate fixed-point
problem to the end-of-a-simple-path problem. The formal treatment of this
reduction is quite involved; a 13-pages proof of the reduction appears in [18].
We present here only a brief intuition for the reduction and the result itself.
Figure 1: A path in G(2, 3).
We divide the n-dimensional cube [0, 1]n into small cubes of edge size
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Figure 2: the function that corresponds to the path in Figure 1. Each arrow
from point a to point b represents f(a) = b. The top-right 3 × 3 squares
corresponds to the nodes in G(2, 3). The rest of the squares are required to
complete the definition of the function. The black dot denotes the unique
exact fixed point of the function. Approximate fixed points are represented
by short arrows.
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δ = Θ(1/k). The small cubes with the neighboring relation form the graph
G(n, k). Let us consider a specific example that explains the idea of the
construction. Given a path on G(2, 3) with no cycles and with the starting
point (1, 1), for example, the path presented in Figure 1, we define a function
f on small cubes of size δ = 1/4 as demonstrated in Figure 2. By observing
Figure 2, the reader may be convinced that the function f has the following
properties:
1. f is Lipschitz continuous. This corresponds to the fact that the arrows
are changed in a smooth manner.
2. All the approximate fixed points of f are placed on the end-of-path
square. This corresponds to the fact that all the arrows outside the
top-right square have constant length, i.e., f(x) is far from x for every
x that is not in the top-right square.
3. For every small square, f depends only on the following parameters of
the path, namely, whether the path goes through this square, and if so,
what the previous and the next visits of the path are. This corresponds
to the locality property of the picture. If the path does not go through
a square, then all the arrows in this square point downward. If the
path goes though some square, it is enough to consider the previous
and the next visits of the path in order to define f for this square.
In [18], Hirsch et al. show that the construction of such a function f can
be generalized to every grid size k and to every dimension n. In particular,
they introduce a general construction that works for every approximation
accuracy ε and every Lipschitz constant λ. For our purposes, it will be
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sufficient to focus on the case5 ε = 1/88, λ = 79. For these values the
construction in [18] states the following:
Given a simple path on G(n, 2) that starts at the point (1, 1, ..., 1), and
ends at the point (ei)
n
i=1 for ei = 1, 2, we divide the cube [0, 1]
n into small
cubes with edge cube size5 δ = 1/6. The vertex (vi)
n
i=1 in the hypercube
corresponds to the small cube×i[1+vi6 , 2+vi6 ] ⊂ [0, 1]n. By this correspondence,
the hypercube is equivalent to all the small cubes that are contained in
[2/6, 4/6]n. The starting point (1, 1, ..., 1) is equivalent to the small cube
[2/6, 3/6]n, and the end point corresponds to the small cube ×i[1+ei6 , 2+ei6 ],
which is denoted by E.
Remark 4. Hirsch et al. [18] construct a function f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n with
the following properties:
(P1) f is 79-Lipschitz (Lemma 10 in [18]).
(P2) ||f(x)− x||∞ ≥ 1/88 for every x /∈ E (Lemma 10 in [18]).
(P3) The value of f on each small block in [2/6, 4/6]n depends only on the
local behavior or the path in the corresponding vertex of the hypercube:
whether the path goes through this vertex, and if so what the previous
and the next visits of the path are (Lemma 11 in [18]).
This construction yields the following result:
Proposition 3. QCp(AFP (n, 79, 1/88)) ≥ QCp(ESP (n)) for every n ≥ 1
and every 0 < p < 1.
5The cube size 1/6, approximation accuracy ε = 1/88, and Lipschitz constant λ = 79
were chosen so that the necessary inequalities for the construction in [18] would be satisfied.
Explicitly, the necessary inequalities are δ ≥ λ1200ε (see [18] page 406), and 2 ≥ (1−10ε)λ1200ε −3
(see [18] page 411).
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Proof. Let P be the set of all simple paths on the hypercube with starting
point (1, 1, ..., 1). Let F be the corresponding set of functions f : [0, 1] →
[0, 1] according to the construction of [18] presented above.
Every AFP algorithm with success probability p on the set of functions
F induces an ESP algorithm with success probability p. The induced ESP
algorithm will follow the AFP algorithm. Each query x ∈ [2/6, 4/6]n will
be mapped to a query of the corresponding vertex. For formal purposes,
we should define also the map for queries x /∈ [2/6, 4/6]n. Clearly those are
meaningful queries because all the functions f ∈ F have the same values for
x /∈ [2/6, 4/6]n. For the sake of formality, we say that a query x /∈ [2/6, 4/6]n
corresponds to the query (1, 1, ..., 1). By property (P3) the answer for the
AFP query contains at least as much information as the answer in the
ESP query. Therefore, in the ESP model it is indeed possible to follow
the AFP algorithm. Finally, by property (P2), once the AFP algorithm
finds a 1/88-fixed point, then the ESP algorithm finds the end of path.
4.3 From End of Path to Hit the Path
We would like to analyze the end-of-simple-path problem in a probabilistic
setting. A similar analysis was recently conducted by Hart and Nisan [17],
who showed that the end-of-(general)-path problem is hard even in proba-
bilistic settings. The difference between our problem and the problem in [17]
is that we assume that the path has no cycles, whereas in [17] there is no
such assumption. As we will see in this section, we can use similar arguments
to derive a hardness result for our end-of-simple-path problem.
The idea in [17] is that finding the end of a random walk on the hypercube
of length 2n/3 is hard. We cannot use directly the idea of a random path
because the random walk has cycles with probability close to 1. Nevertheless,
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we can cut those cycles and get a simple path; this new path is no longer a
random walk on the hypercube, but it does preserve the essential properties
for the hardness result, as we will see below. Formally, given a random walk
v1, v2, ..., v2n/3 , the path after cutting the cycles is defined by the following
iterative procedure: pick the minimal i such that there exists j > i where
vi = vj. Replace the existing path by v1, v2, ..., vi, vj+1, ..., v2n/3 . Repeat this
cutting process until no vertex appears twice in the path. We denote the
resulting path without cycles by w1, w2, ..., wL, where L is a random variable.
Lemma 1. Let (vi)
2n/3
i=1 be a random walk on the n-dimensional hypercube.
Then (vi) contains no cycles of size greater than n
2 with probability of at
least 1− 2 · 2−n/3.
Proof. The mixing time of the random walk on the hypercube is known to
be O(n log n) (see, e.g., [9]). This implies that for every pair of times i, j
where i < j + n2, the probability of vi = vj is at most 2 · 2−n. Therefore,
summing over all such pairs of i, j (we have at most 22n/3 pairs), we get
that the probability that at least one of these events will happen is at most
2 · 2−n/3.
Now we proceed similar to [17]. In order to prove that there is no algo-
rithm that finds wL with high probability, we define the following hit-the-
path (HTP (n)) game between the algorithm and the adversary. The game
is played for T = 2n/3/n4 steps. The adversary chooses a path without cycles
w1, ..., wL. At each step 1 ≤ t ≤ T , the algorithm chooses a vertex qt when
it observes the vertices revealed up to time t − 1: w1, w2, ..., wn2(t−1), i.e.,
qt = qt((wi)
n2(t−1)
i=1 ). The goal of the algorithm is to choose a future vertex, a
vertex that is visited by the path n2 steps later than the last revealed vertex
(wn2(t−1)), i.e., qt = wi for i > tn2. After the algorithm chooses a vertex qt,
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the vertices wn2(t−1)+1, wn2(t−1)+2, ..., wn2t are revealed to the algorithm. The
algorithm wins if it has succeeded to in choosing at least one future vertex.
Otherwise the adversary wins.
Lemma 2. Using the mixed strategy w1, ..., wL, which results from cutting
the cycles of a random walk of size 2n/3, the adversary guarantees a win with
probability of at least 1− 3 · 2−n/3 in the HTP (n) game.
Proof. Let v1, v2, ..., v2n/3 be the random walk that induces the path w1, ..., wL.
For the bound analysis, we assume that if (vi) has at least one cycle of size
greater than n2, then the algorithm automatically wins. By Lemma 1 this
yields a probability of at most 2 · 2−n/3 for the algorithm winning.
In the remaining case, let us change the roles of the game HTP (n)
in favor of the algorithm. First, we will provide the algorithm with more
information at each step. Instead of revealing at each step n2 sequential
values of (wi), we will reveal n
4 sequential values of (vi). Note that n
4
sequential values of (vi) contain at least n
2 values of (wi) because (vi) has
no cycles of size greater than n2. Second, we will let the algorithm win not
only if it hits a future vertex of (wi) but also if it hits a future vertex of (vi).
Using again the mixing time of the random walk argument (see [9]), we
know that at each step the probability of hitting every future vertex vi is at
most 2 · 2−n. Summing over all future vertices and over all steps we get that
in the new game the probability that the algorithm will win is at most
2 · 2−n2n3 2
n
3
n4
≤ 2n3 .
Summing this probability with the probability of automatic winning yields
the result.
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Proposition 4. QCp(ESP (n)) ≥ 2n/3/n4 for p = 3 · 2−n/3 and for every
n ≥ 1.
Proof. In order to show that every probabilistic algorithm fails to find the end
of the path in T = 2n/3/n4 queries with probability of at least p = 1−3·2−n/3,
by the minmax theorem it is enough to show that there exists a distribution
over paths such that every deterministic algorithm fails to find the end of
the path with probability of at least p.
Our random path will be w1, ..., wL, as was described above. It is enough
to show that every algorithm AE for ESP (n) with success probability p
induces a strategy AH in the game HTP (n) with success probability p. The
algorithm AH will just follow the algorithm AE. If up to time t the algorithm
AH has not hit a future vertex of the path, then at time t the AH algorithm
can calculate all the answers to the ESP (n) queries (because in the HTP
settings it has at least as much information as in the HTP settings), and
using those answers it can produce the next query qt+1. Therefore it is indeed
possible to follow the AE algorithm.
Finally, since the end of the path is a future vertex for all steps t, finding
the end of the path will guarantee winning in the HTP (n) game.
4.4 Proof of the main Theorems
The proof of Theorem 1 is obtained by joining the three reductions in Sections
4.1.1, 4.2, and 4.3.
Proof of Theorem 1. By Propositions 4, 3, and 1 we get the result.
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For p = 3 · 2−n/3 we have
2n/3/n4 ≤ QCp(ESP (n))
≤ QCp(AFP (n, 79, 1/88))
≤ QCp(WSN(n, 3608 + 1, 3
4
3608−2))
≤ QCp(WSN(n, 3609, 2−24)).
The proof of Theorem 2 is obtained by joining the three reductions in
Sections 4.1.2, 4.2, and 4.3.
Proof of Theorem 2. By Propositions 4, 3, and 2 we get that for every n and
p = 3 · 2−n/3 holds:
2n/3/n4 ≤ QCp(ESP (n))
≤ QCp(AFP (n, 79, 1/88))
≤ QCp(WSN(7390n, 2, 3695−2)).
By replacing n with n
7390
we have that for p = 3 · 2−n/22170 holds
1016 · 2
n/22170
n4
≥ QCp(WSN(n, 2, 3695−2)).
5 Open problems
This paper presents one basic result on the complexity of an approximate
Nash equilibrium in games with a large number of players n, where every
player has a constant number of actions m (or even just two actions). Even
for these games, many questions still remain open.
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1. For an approximate (not well supported) Nash equilibrium, this result
yields an exponential lower bound of the query complexity, only for the
case where the approximation is ε = O(1/n) (Theorem 4). The case of
an ε-Nash equilibrium for constant ε remains open. What is the query
complexity of an ε-Nash equilibrium for constant ε?
2. The result provides an exponential lower bound for constant but tiny
approximation value, (ε = 1
2
10−7). It will be interesting to improve
the exponential lower bound for bigger values of ε. What is the query
complexity of the problems WSN(n,m, ε) for6 0 << ε < 1/2 and for
constant m?
3. As mentioned in the Introduction, from the computational complex-
ity perspective this result provides evidence that for these games there
is no algorithm for computing an approximate Nash equilibrium with
running time poly(n), or equivalently poly(log(N)) where N = nmn is
the input size. To the best of our knowledge, even poly(N) algorithm is
not known for this class of games. Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta’s [22]
sampling method provides an algorithm for computing an ε-Nash equi-
librium with running time poly(N logN). Daskalakis and Papadimitriou
[8] proved existence of poly(N log logN) algorithm. Babichenko Barman
and Peretz [2] proves existence of poly(N log log logN) algorithm. Is there
an algorithm that computes an ε-Nash equilibrium in poly(N) steps?
4. As mentioned in Section 3.5, query complexity protocol is a special case
of communication complexity protocol, i.e., the communication com-
plexity lower bound induces a query complexity lower bound, but not
vice versa. We want to emphasize that the communication complexity
6For ε = 1/2 it is known that the query complexity is polynomial; see [7] and [10].
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of an approximate (well-supported or not) Nash equilibrium remains an
open question.
References
[1] Babichenko, Y. and Barman, S. (2013) “Query Complexity of Correlated
Equilibrium,” arXiv:1306.2437.
[2] Babichenko, Y., Barman, and Peretz, R. (2014) “Simple approximate
equilibria in large games,” in Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference
on Economics and Computation, pp. 753–770.
[3] Blume, L. (1993) “The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction,”
Games and Economic Behavior 5, 387–424.
[4] Chen, X. and Deng, X., (2006) “Settling the Complexity of Two-Player
Nash Equilibrium,” in 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations
of Computer Science, pp. 261–272.
[5] Conitzer, V. and Sandholm, T. (2004) “Communication Complexity as
a Lower Bound for Learning in Games,” The Twenty-First International
Conference on Machine Learning, 185–192.
[6] Daskalakis, C., Goldberg, P. W., and Papadimitriou, C. H., (2009) “The
Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium,” SIAM Journal of Com-
puting 39, 195-259.
[7] Daskalakis, C., Mehta, A., and Papadimitriou, C. H. (2009) “A Note
on Approximate Nash Equilibria,” Theoretical Computer Science 410,
1581–1588.
37
[8] Daskalakis, C. and Papadimitriou, C. H. (2008) “Discretized Multino-
mial Distributions and Nash equilibria in Anonymous Games,” Proceed-
ings of the 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science, pp. 25–34.
[9] Diaconis, P., Graham, R. L., and Morrison J. A. (1990) “Asymptotic
Analysis of a Random Walk on a Hypercube with Many Dimensions,”
Random Structures and Algorithms, 1, 51-72.
[10] Fearnley, J., Gairing, M., Goldberg, P. W., and Savani, R. (2013)
“Learning Equilibria of Games Via Payoff Queries,” in Proceedings of
the 14th ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 397–414.
[11] Goldberg, P.W., and Roth, A. (2014) “Bounds for the query complexity
of approximate equilibria.” in Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference
on Economics and Computation, pp. 639–656.
[12] Hart, S. and Mansour, Y. (2010) “How Long to Equilibrium? The Com-
munication Complexity of Uncoupled Equilibrium Procedures,” Games
and Economic Behavior 69, 107–126.
[13] Hart, S. and Mas-Colell, A. (2000) “A Simple Adaptive Procedure Lead-
ing to Correlated Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 68, 1127-1150.
[14] Hart, S. and Mas-Colell, A. (2003) “Uncoupled Dynamics do Not Lead
to Nash Equilibrium,” American Economic Review 93, 1830–1836.
[15] Hart, S. and Mas-Colell, A. (2005) “Adaptive Heuristics,” Econometrica
73, 1401–1430.
[16] Hart, S. and Mas-Colell, A. (2006) “Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics
and Nash Equilibrium,” Games and Economic Behavior 57, 286–303.
38
[17] Hart, S. and Nisan, N. (2013) “The Query Complexity of Correlated
Equilibria,” arXiv:1305.4874.
[18] Hirsch, M. D., Papadimitriou, C. H., and Vavasis, S. A. (1989) “Ex-
ponential Lower Bounds for Finding Brower Fixed Points,” Journal of
Complexity 5, 379–416.
[19] Hoeffding, W. (1963) “Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded
Random Variables,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 58,
13–30.
[20] Jiang, A. X. and Layton-Brown, K. (2013) “Polynomial-time Computa-
tion of Exact Correlated Equilibrium in Compact Games,” Games and
Economic Behavior, forthcoming.
[21] Kushilevitz, E. and Nisan, N., 1997. Communication Complexity. Cam-
bridge Univ. Press.
[22] Lipton, R. J., Markakis, E., and Mehta, A. (2003) “Playing Large Games
Using Simple Strategies,” in Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce, pp. 36–41.
[23] Littlestone, N. and Warmuth, M. K. (1989) “The Weighted Majority
Algorithm,” in 30th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science, pp. 256–261.
[24] Papadimitriou, C. H. and Roughgarden, T. (2008) “Computing Corre-
lated Equilibria in Multi-Player Games,” Journal of the ACM 55, Article
No. 14.
[25] Robinson, J. (1951) “An Iterative Method of Solving a Game,”, Annals
of Mathematics 54, 296–301.
39
[26] Rubinstein, A. (2014) “Computational Complexity of Approximate
Nash Equilibrium in Large Games,” arXiv:1405.0524.
[27] Rubinstein, A. (2014) “Inapproximability of Nash Equilibrium,”
arXiv:1405.3322.
[28] Sandholm, W. H. (2010) Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics,
MIT Press.
[29] Shmaya, E. (January 5, 2012) “Brouwer Implies Nash Implies Brouwer,”
The Leisure of the Theory Class, http://theoryclass.wordpress.com/
2012/01/05/brouwer-implies-nash-implies-brouwer/.
6 Appendix A- Proof of Theorem 4
Proof of Theorem 4. We start with the following modification of Lemma 4.28
in [6] on the construction of approximate WSNE from approximate NE.
Let x = xi be a (ε
2/(16n))-Nash equilibrium. For every player i we
classify the actions of player i into three groups, according to the outcome
of this action against x−i (Gi good actions, Mi medium actions, and Bi bad
actions).
Gi = {ai ∈ Ai : bri − ε
4
≤ ui(ai, x−i)}
Mi = {ai ∈ Ai : bri − ε
2
< ui(ai, x−i) ≤ bri − ε
4
}
Bi = {ai ∈ Ai : ui(ai, x−i) < bri − ε
2
}
We fix some g∗i ∈ Gi, and we let yi be any mixed action that moves all the
probability mass from Bi to g
∗
i , and in addition moves some probability mass
from Mi to g
∗
i (in any possible way). Formally, yi(Bi) = 0, yi(mi) ≤ xi(mi)
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for every mi ∈Mi, yi(gi) = xi(gi) for every gi ∈ Gi gi 6= g∗i , and finally yi(g∗i )
is defined so that the total measure of yi is 1.
Now we claim that every such profile (yi)
n
i=1 is an ε-WSNE.
First, let us note that xi(Mi ∪ Bi) ≤ ε/(4n) because otherwise, only the
losses from playing the actions in Mi ∪ Bi will be higher than (ε2/(16n)).
Therefore, the distance in total variation from xi to yi is at most ε/(4n).
Second, let us note that if every opponent of player i changes his mixed
strategy with probability of at most ε/(4n), then the payoff of player i may
change by at most (n−1)ε/(4n) < ε/4 (we recall that the payoffs are bounded
in [0, 1]).
Finally, every action that is played by yi with positive probability is an
ε/2-best reply to x−i. Therefore it is an ε-best reply to y−i, because the best
reply may increase by at most ε/4, whereas the performance of each action
may decrease by at most ε/4.
Now, if we fix the threshold for classifying good and bad actions to be
bri − 3ε/8, and we receive answers about ui(ai, x−i) with precision ε/8 then
indeed all the good actions will be classified to Gi, and all the bad actions
will be classified to Bi. It will make no difference to us where the actions in
Mi are classified.
Now we are able to prove the reduction from an ANE algorithm to a
WSN algorithm. We show that every ANE(n, 2, ε2/(16n)) algorithm that
uses T − 64n2/εn2 queries and has success probability p + 2−n induces an
WSN(n, 2, ε) algorithm that uses T samples and has success probability
p. The WSN algorithm follows the ANE algorithm to find a (ε2/(16n))-
Nash equilibrium. Then it evaluates the numbers ui(ai, x−i) using 32n/ε2
samples (the total number of samples will be 2n32n
ε2
). By the Hoeffding
inequality the probability that all the samples will approximate the values
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ui(ai, x−i) with precision of ε/8 is at least 1 − 4ne−n > 1 − 2−n. Then the
algorithm will use the above procedure with the threshold bri − 3 · 10−8/8.
If the ANE algorithm indeed finds a (ε2/(16n))-Nash equilibrium, and the
samples indeed ε/8-approximate all the values ui(ai, x−i) that accrue with
probability of at least p, then the induced WSN algorithm has succeeded
in finding ε-WSNE.
For a constant ε we get from Theorem 2 that every ANE(n, 2, ε2/(16n))
algorithm that uses 2Ω(n) − 64n2/ε2 = 2Ω(n) queries has success probability
of at most 2−Ω(n) + 2−n = 2−Ω(n). In order to complete the proof, we observe
that
2Ω(n) = 2Ω(
ε2
16
n) ≤ QCp
(
ANE
(
ε2
16
n, 2,
1
n
))
≤ QCp(ANE(n, 2, 1
n
)).
7 Appendix B- distribution-queries dynam-
ics
The class of k-distribution-queries dynamics is defined similarly to k-queries
dynamics.
Definition 2. A dynamic will be called k-distribution-queries dynamic, if
there exists a mapping that assigns to each history of play a set of k (addi-
tional) distribution payoff queries, such that the mixed strategy of all players
at time t can be calculated using the tk queries until time t.
By the definition of k-distribution-queries dynamics, for every such dy-
namic the mixed strategy of player i at time t is xi(t) = fi(u(d1), ..., u(dtk))
where d1, ..., dtk ∈ ∆(A) are the distribution-queries that was asked until
time t.
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We use the total variation distance on ∆(Ai), i.e., for xi, yi ∈ ∆(Ai)
d1(xi, yi) =
m∑
j=1
|xi(aj)− yi(aj)|.
Definition 3. We will say that a k-distribution-queries dynamic is
ν-Lipschitz continuous if it is ν-Lipschitz continuous with respect to the
answers of the queries, i.e., d1(fi(v1, ..., vtk), fi(w1, ..., wtk)) ≤ να for every
player i, every t ∈ N and every pair of n-dimensional vector sequences
(v1, ..., vtk), (w1, ..., wtk) that satisfy ||vl − wl||∞ ≤ α for every l ∈ [tk].
ν Lipschitz continuity of the dynamic, simply means that the mixed
strategies of the players will not change by a lot if the answers to the payoff
queries not changes by a lot.
Now we are able to state the version of Corollary 2 for the case of k-
distribution-queries dynamics.
Theorem 6. There exists constant ε, k = 2Ω(n) and T = 2Ω(n) such that
there exists no ν-Lipschitz continuous k-distribution-queries dynamic that
converges to an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium in T steps with probability
more than ν2−Ω(n) in all n-player binary action games.
Note that the exponential lower bound holds even if the Lipschitz constant
ν is exponentially large.
Proof of Theorem 6. Fix constant ε and fix T = 2Ω(n), k = 2Ω(n), p = 2−Ω(n)
δ = 2−Ω(n) such that
1. Every distribution query algorithm that uses Tk distribution queries,
and receives answers with precision δ, finds an ε-WSNE in n-player
binary-action games with probability of at most p. By Theorem 3 such
values ε, T, k, p, and δ exist.
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2. δT = 2−Ω(n). We can always guarantee this condition by reducing the
constant at the exponent of T . Note that if condition (1) is satisfied
then it is satisfied also after reducing the constant at the exponent of
T .
Given a ν-Lipschitz dynamic D that finds ε-WSNE in T steps with prob-
ability p + νδnT = p + ν2−Ω(n), we define a new class of dynamics Dδ that
receives the answers to the queries with noise δ (every different noise on the
queries defines a different dynamic). The dynamic D defines a random vari-
able h(T ) over histories of play of size T . Similarly, every dynamic Dδ ∈ Dδ
defines the random variable hδ(T ). By ν-Lipschitz continuity, for every his-
tory h the total variation distance between the mixed actions of each player
(in D and Dδ) is at most νδ. Therefore, the total variation of the mixed
action profile is νδn (we recall that total variation is a metric and we can
use triangle inequality). Therefore, the total variation distance between the
random variables h(T ) and hδ(T ) is at most νδnT . Therefore, if using h(T )
we can find an ε-WSNE with probability of at least p + νδnT , then using
hδ(T ) we can find an ε-WSNE with probability of at least p.
Every class of T -steps k-distribution-queries dynamics Dδ induces an al-
gorithm that uses Tk distribution queries with answer precision δ. By condi-
tion (1) above, every algorithm solves the WSN dist(n, 2, ε, δ) problem with
probability of at most p = 2−Ω(n) after Tk queries. Therefore, there is no
dynamic D that converges to ε-WSNE in T steps with probability more than
p+ ν2−Ω(n) = ν2−Ω(n).
44
